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Abstract
In this paper we give an overview of an essential part of a Π01 ordinal
analysis of Peano Arithmetic (PA) as presented by Beklemishev ([3]). This
analysis is mainly performed within the polymodal provability logic GLPω.
We reflect on ways of extending this analysis beyond PA. A main
difficulty in this is to find proper generalizations of the so-called Reduc-
tion Property. The Reduction Property relates reflection principles to
reflection rules.
In this paper we prove a result that simplifies the reflection rules.
Moreover, we see that for an ordinal analysis the full Reduction Property
is not needed. This latter observation is also seen to open up ways for
applications of ordinal analysis relative to some strong base theory.
1 Introduction
Primitive Recursive Arithmetic (PRA) is a rather weak formal theory about the
natural numbers which is among various philosophers, logicians and mathemati-
cians held to be a good candidate for the concept of finitism (see e.g., [15]). The
concept of finitism tries to capture those mathematical truths and that part of
mathematical reasoning which is true beyond doubt and which not uses strong
assumptions on infinite mathematical entities.
Gentzen showed in his seminal paper from 1936 ([11]) that PRA together
with some clearly non-finitist notion of transfinite induction for easy formulas
along a rather small ordinal could prove the consistency of Peano Arithmetic
(PA).
This result can be seen as a partial realization of Hilbert’s programme where
finitist theories are to prove the consistency of strong mathematical theories. Of
course, since Go¨del’s incompleteness results we know that this program is not
viable but Gentzen’s consistency proof seems to clearly isolate the non-finitist
part needed for such a consistency proof.
Since Gentzen’s consistency proof, the scientific community has tried to cal-
ibrate the proof-strength of various theories other than PA. The amount of
transfinite induction needed in these consistency proofs is referred to as the
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proof-theoretic ordinal of a theory. There are various ways of defining and com-
puting these ordinals and for most natural theories these methods all yield the
same ordinals.
Among these methods the more novel one was introduced by Beklemishev [3]
and is based on modal provability logics. The corresponding ordinals are referred
to as the Π01 ordinals. In this paper we shall sketch the method for computing
these Π01 ordinals. So far, the method has only been applied successfully to
theories as PA and its kin. In this paper we reflect on ways of extending this
analysis beyond PA.
A main difficulty in this is to find proper generalizations of the so-called
Reduction Property. The Reduction Property relates reflection principles to
reflection rules. In this paper we prove a result that simplifies the reflection rules.
Moreover, we see that for an ordinal analysis the full Reduction Property is not
needed. This latter observation is also seen to open up ways for applications of
ordinal analysis relative to some strong base theory.
Before we can start looking into the ordinal analysis, we must first introduce
some basic knowledge concerning arithmetic and provability logics.
2 Prerequisites
All results in this section are given without proofs. For further background the
reader is referred to standard textbooks like [6] or [12].
2.1 Arithmetic
By the language of arithmetic we understand in this paper the language based
on the symbols {0, S,+,×, exp,≤,=} where exp denotes the function x 7→ 2x.
Formulas of arithmetic are stratified in complexity classes as usual. Thus,
∆00 formulas are first-order formulas where all quantifiers refer to numbers and
are bounded by some term t as in ∀x≤t where of course x /∈ t.
We define Σ00 := Π
0
0 := ∆
0
0. If ϕ(~x, ~y) ∈ Σ
0
n, then ∀~x ϕ(~x, ~y) ∈ Π
0
n+1 and
likewise, if ϕ(~x, ~y) ∈ Π0n, then ∃~x ϕ(~x, ~y) ∈ Σ
0
n+1.
Similarly we define the hierarchies Πnm where now the number of nth-order
quantifiers is counted although in this paper we shall at most need second order
quantifiers.
By EA we denote the arithmetic theory of Elementary Arithmetic. This
theory is formulated in the language of arithmetic. Apart from the defining
axioms for the symbols in the language, EA has an induction axiom Iϕ for each
∆00 formula ϕ(~x, y) (that may contain exp):
Iϕ(~x) : ϕ(~x, 0) ∧ ∀ y (ϕ(~x, y)→ ϕ(~x, y + 1)) → ∀yϕ(~x, y).
By EA+ we denote EA plus the axiom that states that super-exponentiation
–the function that maps x to the x times iteration of exp– is a total function.
2
By IΣn we denote the theory that is as EA except that it now has induction
axioms Iϕ for all formulas ϕ(~x) ∈ Σ
0
n. The theory PA is the union of all the
IΣn in that it has induction axioms for all arithmetic formulas.
2.2 Transfinite induction
Greek letters will often denote ordinals and as usual we denote by ε0 the supre-
mum of {ω, ωω, ωω
ω
, . . .}. Apart from considering induction along the natural
numbers we shall consider induction along transfinite orderings too. If 〈Γ,≺〉
is a natural arithmetical representation in EA of some ordinal we denote by
TI[X,Γ] the collection of transfinite induction axioms for all formulas in X :
∀y
(
∀ y′≺y ϕ(~x, y′)→ ϕ(~x, y)
)
→ ∀y ϕ(~x, y) with ϕ(~x, y) ∈ X .
2.3 Formalized metamathematics
Throughout this paper we shall use representations in arithmetic of various
metamathematical notions. In particular we fix some Go¨del numbering to rep-
resent formulas and other syntactical objects in arithmetic.
Moreover, we assume that we can represent r.e. theories in a suitable way
so that we can speak of “the formula ϕ is provable in the theory T ” whose
formalization we shall denote by Tϕ. Dually, we shall use the notion of “the
formula ϕ is consistent with the theory T ” which is denoted by ConT (ϕ) or ♦Tϕ.
If we write Tϕ(x˙) we denote by that a formula whose free variable is x,
and so that provably for every x, the formula Tϕ(x˙) is equivalent to Tϕ(x).
Here x denotes the numeral of x, that is,
x =
x times︷ ︸︸ ︷
S . . . S 0.
3 Provability logics
The logics GLPΛ provide provability logics for a series of provability predi-
cates/modalities [α] of increasing strength.
Definition 3.1. Let Λ be an ordinal. By GLPΛ we denote the poly-modal propo-
sitional logic that has for each α < Λ a modality [α] (that syntactically binds as
the negation symbol). The axioms of GLP are all propositional logical tautologies
in this signature together with instantiations of the following schemes:
[α](A→ B)→ ([α]A→ [α]B) ∀α < Λ;
[α]([α]A→ A)→ [α]A ∀α < Λ;
[α]A→ [β]A ∀α ≤ β < Λ;
〈α〉A→ [β]〈α〉A ∀α < β < Λ.
As always we have that 〈α〉A := ¬[α]¬A. The rules are Modus Ponens and a
Necessitation rule for each modality below Γ, that is, A[α]A .
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By GLP we shall denote class-size logic which is the “union” of GLPΛ over
all Λ ∈ On. The closed fragment of GLPΛ is the set of its theorems that do
not contain any propositional variables and is denoted by GLP0Λ. It turns out
that GLP0Λ is already a very rich structure that is strong enough to perform
major parts of our ordinal analysis. Some privileged inhabitants of GLP0Λ are
the so-called worms. They are just iterated consistency statements in GLP0Λ.
Definition 3.2 (SΛ). ⊤ ∈ SΛ, and if both A ∈ SΛ and β < Λ, then 〈β〉A ∈ SΛ.
We can define an order <0 on S
Λ by A <0 B :⇔ GLP
0
Λ ⊢ B → 〈0〉A. It is
known ([5, 2]) that this ordering makes SΛ into a well-order.
3.1 The Reduction Property
Japaridze ([7]) has shown GLPω to be arithmetically sound and complete if
we interpret [n] as “provable by n applications of the ω-rule”. Ignatiev then
showed in [13] that this completeness result actually holds for a wide range
of arithmetical readings of [n]. In particular, we still have completeness when
reading [n] as a natural formalization of “provable in EA together with all true
Π0n sentences”.
For the remainder of the section, let [n] refer to this latter reading. The
advantage of this reading is that certain worms can be easily linked to reflection
principles and fragments of arithmetic:
Lemma 3.3. EA + 〈n+ 2〉⊤ ≡ EA+ RFNΣn+2(EA) ≡ IΣn+1.
Proof. We shall refrain from distinguishing a modal formula from its arithmeti-
cal interpretation if the context allows us to. Thus, in this statement, 〈n+ 2〉⊤
clearly refers to the formalized statement that EA together with all true Π0n+2-
formulas is consistent.
By RFNΣn+1(EA) we denote the set of axioms {[0]EAσ(x˙) → σ(x) | σ ∈
Σn+1}.
The EA+ 〈n+2〉⊤ ≡ EA+RFNΣn+2(EA) equivalence is actually rather easy
and can be found in [4]. The remaining equivalence EA+RFNΣn+2(EA) ≡ IΣn+1
is a classical result by Leivant [14].
We can write RFNΣn(EA) also as π(x) → ♦EAπ(x˙) for π(x) ∈ Π
0
n. This in
turn can be studied as a rule rather than an implication: pi(x)
♦EApi(x˙)
. In this rule
we can vary both the complexity class to which π(x) belongs and the notion of
provability used (here just ♦EA which is 〈0〉EA) giving rise to a scala of different
rules. In [3, 4] these rules are introduced and studied.
Definition 3.4. The Reflection rule Π0m−RR
n(U) is defined as pi(x)〈n〉Upi(x˙) where
π ∈ Π0m.
The following theorem is called the Reduction Property. A proof of it can
be found in either one of [3, 4].
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Theorem 3.5. The theory EA + RFNΣn+1 is Π
0
n+1-conservative over EA +
Π0n+1−RR
n(EA).
The Reduction Property can be stated and proved under more general con-
ditions but for the current purpose this presentation suffices. At first glance it
might seem a mere technicality but it implies various classical results like Par-
son’s result that IΣ1 is Π
0
2-conservative over PRA. Moreover, as we shall see, it
is one of the main ingredients in our ordinal analysis.
3.2 Simplifying the Reflection Rule
In this subsection we shall see that we can simplify the family of reflection rules
considerably. We prefer to work in a general setting here. Thus, let [n]U be any
series of provability predicates over a theory U that is sound for GLP. Moreover,
we have for each n ∈ ω that the formalized deduction theorem holds:
U ⊢ [n]U+ϕψ ⇐⇒ U ⊢ [n]U (ϕ→ ψ).
The Reflection Rule as studied in the GLP project has currently two param-
eters n and m:
Π0m−RR
n(U + ϕ) :=
ψ
〈n〉(ϕ ∧ ψ)
for ϕ ∈ Πm.
In virtue of the easy lemmas below we shall see that we can drop the parameter
m as over U , for m > n all the versions turn out to be equivalent, and for m ≤ n
the rule is just equivalent to the axiom 〈n〉ϕ. Thus, we propose to just speak of
the RRn(U + ϕ):
RRn(U + ϕ) :=
ψ
〈n〉(ψ ∧ ϕ)
without any restriction on the complexity of ψ. In the remainder of this subsec-
tion, we shall assume that 〈n〉ϕ is of complexity Π0n+1. However if this were not
the case, the arguments go through exactly the same by replacing each occur-
rence of Π0n+1 by Π˜
0
n+1 where Π˜
0
n+1 represents some natural complexity class to
which 〈n〉ϕ belongs.
Definition 3.6. Let Q0n(ϕ) = 〈n〉Uϕ and Q
k+1
n (ϕ) = 〈n〉U (ϕ ∧Q
k
n(ϕ)).
Lemma 3.7. Let l,m, n ∈ ω and l > n < m. We have that
U +Πl − RR
n(U + ϕ) ≡ U +Πm − RR
n(U + ϕ) ≡ U + {Qkn(ϕ) | k ∈ ω}.
Proof. As the complexity of Qkn(ϕ) is Πn+1 for any k and ϕ, it is easy to see by
an induction on k that for any k,m, n ∈ ω we have
Πm − RR
n(U + ϕ) ⊢ Qkn(ϕ)
so that U +Πm − RR
n(U + ϕ) ⊇ U + {Qkn(ϕ) | k ∈ ω}.
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For the reverse inclusion we do induction on the number of applications of
the rule Πm − RR
n(U + ϕ). So, suppose that for some χ ∈ Πm we have that
U +Πm−RR
n(U +ϕ) ⊢ χ. By the IH we have U ⊢ Qkn(ϕ)→ χ for some natural
number k. But then by necessitation we have U ⊢ [n](Qkn(ϕ) → χ) whence
U +Qk+1n (ϕ) ⊢ 〈n〉U (ϕ ∧ χ) as was to be shown.
Lemma 3.8. Let m,n ∈ ω with n ≥ m. We have that
U +Πm − RR
n(U + ϕ) ≡ U + 〈n〉ϕ.
Proof. Clearly, by one application of the Πm−RR
n(U +ϕ) rule we obtain ⊤〈n〉ϕ .
Thus
U + 〈n〉ϕ ⊆ U +Πm − RR
n(U + ϕ).
To prove the converse implication we show that U + 〈n〉ϕ is closed under the
rule. Thus, reason in U + 〈n〉ϕ and suppose we have proved ψ with ψ ∈ Πm.
As ψ ∈ Σn+1 we have that ψ → [n]ψ. We combine this with 〈n〉ϕ to obtain the
required 〈n〉(ψ ∧ ϕ).
We note that a similar argument applies to GLPΛ once we have fixed suitable
formulas Qkα(ϕ) there and have specified complexity classes for formulas of the
form 〈α〉ψ.
3.3 The Reduction Property revisited
In more generality, we can define for GLP formulas –not just worms– an ordering
over GLP:
ϕ <α ψ ⇔ GLP ⊢ ψ → 〈α〉ϕ.
With respect to these orderings, consistency statements behave very well and
admit some sort of fundamental sequence. For any formula ϕ we defined Qkα(ϕ)
for k ∈ ω by Q0α(ϕ) := 〈α〉ϕ and Q
k+1
α (ϕ) := 〈α〉(ϕ ∧ Q
k
α(ϕ)). With these
formulas at hand we can state part of the fundamental sequence result to the
effect that the formulas {Qkn(ϕ)}k∈ω substitutes a fundamental sequence of 〈n+
1〉ϕ.
Lemma 3.9. For each k ∈ ω we have that GLP ⊢ 〈α + 1〉ϕ → Qkα(ϕ) whence
also GLP ⊢ 〈α+ 1〉ϕ→ 〈α〉Qkα(ϕ).
A proof of this lemma is not hard and can be found, e.g., in [4]. The other
half of the fundamental sequence result is in virtue of the above just recasting
the Reduction Property in terms of GLP.
Theorem 3.10. EA+〈n+1〉ϕ is Πn+1-conservative over EA+{Q
k
n(ϕ) | k ∈ ω}.
Proof. By Lemma 3.9 we see that EA+{Qkn(ϕ) | k ∈ ω} ⊆ EA+〈n+1〉ϕ. The
Πn+1-conservativity follows directly from the Reduction Property –Theorem
3.5– and Lemma 3.7 above.
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The main ingredient of the proof of the Reduction Property is a cut-elimination
argument. Thus, as was noted in previous papers, the theorem above –Theorem
3.10– is formalizable as soon as the superexponential function is provably total
and in particular in EA+. From this fact we get a powerful result concerning
provable equi-consistency (see e.g. [4]):
Theorem 3.11. For m ≤ n we have that EA+ ⊢ 〈m〉〈n+1〉ϕ ↔ ∀k 〈m〉Qkn(ϕ).
Proof. We reason in EA+ and prove the equivalence by contraposition. Lemma
3.9 is actually already provable in EA so that we see
∃k [m]Qk
n
(ϕ)⊥ → [m]〈n+1〉ϕ⊥.
For the other direction we invoke the Reduction Property as stated in Theorem
3.10.
So, still reasoning in EA+, we suppose that [m]〈n+1〉ϕ⊥. Let π be the con-
junction of Π0m sentences that are used in the EA+〈n+1〉ϕ proof of ⊥. Thus, we
get that [0]〈n+1〉ϕ¬π. As ¬π ∈ Π
0
n+1 we get by the formalized reduction prop-
erty that [0]Qk
n
(ϕ)¬π for some (possibly non-standard) number k. The latter
implies [m]Qk
n
(ϕ)⊥ and we are done.
4 A Π01-ordinal analysis for PA
The following theorem with proof can be found in full detail in [4]. We present
here the main part of the proof but refer for certain claims made here to [4].
Theorem 4.1. EA+ + TI[Π01, ε0] ⊢ Con(PA)
Proof. It is well-known that the equivalence between reflection, induction and
consistency as stated in Lemma 3.3 can actually be formalized in EA+. Thus, we
reason in EA+ and observe that we have PA ⊆ EA+{〈1〉⊤, 〈2〉⊤, 〈3〉⊤, 〈4〉⊤, . . .}.
Consequently, Con(EA+ {〈1〉⊤, 〈2〉⊤, 〈3〉⊤, 〈4〉⊤, . . .})→ Con(PA) and we shall
complete our proof by showing Con(EA + {〈1〉⊤, 〈2〉⊤, 〈3〉⊤, 〈4〉⊤, . . .}). For
this, it suffices to show
∀n 〈0〉〈n〉⊤. (1)
We shall prove this by transfinite induction. It is known that 〈Sω, <0〉 is
provably in EA isomorphic to 〈ε0, <〉. Thus it suffices to perform a transfinite
induction over the structure 〈Sω, <0〉. Clearly
∀A∈Sω 〈0〉A (2)
implies (1), so we shall prove (2) by transfinite induction over 〈Sω, <0〉. We
set out to prove ∀A∈Sω (∀A′<0A 〈0〉A
′ → 〈0〉A) from which (2) follows, and
distinguish three cases:
1. A = ⊤ in which case we have 〈0〉⊤ as EA+ proves the consistency of EA.
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2. A is of the form 〈0〉B for some worm B.
It is well-known that EA+ ⊢ RFNΣ01(EA). So in particular, as [0]B is a
Σ01-sentence, we get [0][0]B → [0]B. Thus also 〈0〉B → 〈0〉〈0〉B. However,
as B <0 A we have by the induction hypothesis that 〈0〉B and we are
done.
3. A is of the form 〈n+ 1〉B for some worm B and natural number n.
So, we need to prove 〈0〉〈n+ 1〉B. By Theorem 3.11 we get that
〈0〉〈n+ 1〉B ↔ ∀k 〈0〉Qkn(B).
However, as for each k ∈ ω we have by Lemma 3.9 that Qkn(B) <0 〈n+1〉B
we are done by the induction hypothesis.
On the basis of Theorem 4.1 one could decide to call ε0 the proof-theoretical
ordinal of PA. Like many other ordinal analyses, the current analysis is sus-
ceptible to plugging in pathological ordinal notation systems so as to get way
weaker or stronger proof-theoretical ordinals for PA. However, we feel confident
to judge ourselves which notation system is natural enough to use and which
not.
We shall now briefly say why this particular ordinal is called the Π01 ordinal
of PA. If we define Turing progressions EAα of EA by transfinite induction in
the standard way as EA0 := EA, and EAα := ∪β<α(EAβ + Con(EAβ)) we can
define a Π01 proof theoretical ordinal based on these EA
α. For a target theory
T we define |T |Π01 –the Π
0
1 proof theoretical ordinal of T – to be the smallest α
for which EAα comprises all the Π01 consequences of T .
For natural theories T and natural ordinal notation systems, this ordinal
will coincide with the ordinal obtained by an analysis presented in Theorem
4.1. Moreover for T = PA and various sub-systems T of PA, it is known that
|T |Π01 coincides with all the other known ordinal analyses like |T |Π11 or |T |Π02 .
We mention these other proof-theoretical ordinals here without further detail
and just to provide some context. In this same spirit it is worth mentioning
that |T |Π01 is more fine-grained than any of the others. For example, |PA +
Con(PA)|Π11 = |PA + Con(PA)|Π02 = |PA|Π02 = ε0 whereas |PA + Con(PA)|Π01 =
ε0 · 2.
5 Ingredients for going beyond PA
The paradigm for Π01 is nice in that it provides a more fine-grained analysis
than all other ordinal analyses around. In a sense, it provides the finest analysis
possible as different true theories will at least differ on Π01 sentences. A critique
to the paradigm is that the analysis has so far only been performed for rather
weak mathematical theories: PA and its kin.
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If we wish to address stronger theories than PA there are two paths that one
can take. In the next subsection we discuss one such path where the base theory
is strengthened. In the remaining subsection we speak about the approach where
we strengthen GLPω to GLPΛ with Λ > ω.
5.1 Relative Π0
1
ordinal analysis
We can choose to stay within GLPω and strengthen our base theory X . So, if
we wish to analyze some target theory U with the Π01 paradigm relative to X ,
the question translates to how often one should iterate the Turing progression
based on X to comprise all the Π01 consequences of U . In the next section we
shall analyze this in further detail.
5.2 Beyond GLPω
Another choice to strengthen the applicability of the paradigm is to use modal
provability logics that go beyond GLPω. Currently most efforts of taking the
paradigm further are along these lines. There are two main aspects involved
here. The first is to extend the modal theory of GLP beyond GLPω and the
other is to find suitable (hyper)arithmetical interpretations of the modalities
[α] involved.
5.2.1 The modal theory
By now, the modal theory of GLPΛ is rather well studied and understood. A
first and seminal step in this direction was taken by Beklemishev in [5]. In
particular, the paper focussed on the closed fragment GLP0 of GLP and studied
the worms in there. It was shown that the orderings <0 are well behaved also
in the class-size GLP0 and define a well order provided the irreflexivity of <0.
The irreflexivity of <0 has been shown both in [2] and [8]. In particular [8]
provides a class-size universal model for GLP0. The ordering <0 and natural and
important generalizations are now well studied and understood as presented in
[5, 10, 9].
Although there are various important and interesting questions open in the
modal theory of the logics GLPΛ it seems that all modal theory is in place to
move the Π01 ordinal analysis beyond PA.
5.2.2 Hyperarithmetic interpretations and the Reduction Property
Currently the aim the GLP project is to provide an ordinal analysis of predicative
analysis whose classical proof-theoretical ordinal is the Feferman-Schu¨tte ordinal
Γ0. Various natural candidates of provability notions have been seen to be sound
and complete for GLPΓ0 . However, so far, for none of this interpretations a
natural generalization of the Reduction Property has been established.
In the final section of this paper we shall briefly mention some of these
generalized provability notions. In the next section we shall see how the need
of a full Reduction Property can be circumvented.
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6 Reduction Property, equi-consistency, and rel-
ative ordinal analysis
In this section we shall see how we can minimize the ingredients needed for
a consistency proof as presented in Theorem 4.1. In particular we shall not
need the full Reduction Property but rather some weak version of it in terms of
equi-consistency.
We shall see that the following steps suffice. Below, let U denote the target
theory of which we wish to perform an ordinal analysis.
1. We fix some base theory X over which most of our arguments will be
performed;
2. We find some notions of consistency over X of increasing strength
{〈0〉Xϕ, 〈1〉Xϕ, 〈2〉Xϕ, 〈3〉Xϕ, . . .},
so that the following properties are obtained (we shall drop subscripts X )
(a) The notion 〈n〉T grows monotone both in n and in T and for all nat-
ural numbers n, theories T , and formulas ϕ, ψ we have that provably
in some weak theory but certainly in X
〈n〉T +ϕψ ↔ 〈n〉T (ψ ∧ ϕ);
(b) The logic GLP is sound for the corresponding dual provability oper-
ators [n]X ;
(c) We have that (provably in some weak theory but certainly in X )
U ⊆ X + {〈0〉X⊤, 〈1〉X⊤, 〈2〉X⊤, 〈3〉X⊤, . . .};
(d) The theory X + 〈n + 1〉⊤ is equi-consistent with the theory X +
{Qkn(⊤) | k ∈ ω} where Q
0
n(ϕ) = 〈n〉ϕ and Q
k+1
n (ϕ) = 〈n〉(ϕ ∧
Qkn(ϕ)). This equi-consistency should be provable in some weak ex-
tension X+ of X .
We shall now see that these ingredients suffice to perform a consistency proof
of U relative to X formalized in X+.
Theorem 6.1. Suppose we have fixed X and consistency notions as above.
Then
X+ + TI(Π˜01, ε0) ⊢ Con(U),
where Π˜01 is some complexity class that corresponds to the consistency notion
〈0〉X .
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Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.1. We reason in X+. By 2c
above, we have that U ⊆ X + {〈0〉X⊤, 〈1〉X⊤, 〈2〉X⊤, 〈3〉X⊤, . . .} whence also
〈0〉{〈0〉X⊤,〈1〉X⊤,〈2〉X⊤,〈3〉X⊤,...}⊤ → 〈0〉ZFC⊤.
Clearly, by 2a we have that
〈0〉{〈0〉X⊤,〈1〉X⊤,〈2〉X⊤,〈3〉X⊤,...}⊤ ↔ ∀n 〈0〉〈n〉⊤.
We now reason inside some weak extension X+ of X and conclude by using
transfinite induction and showing that ∀n 〈0〉X 〈n〉X⊤. Clearly it suffices to
show that for all worms A in GLPω we have that 〈0〉XA. Thus, we set out to
prove
∀A [∀B<0A 〈0〉XB → 〈0〉XA]. (3)
We choose X+ strong enough so that it at least contains RFN˜Σ01
(X ) in order to
have
1. X+ ⊢ 〈0〉X⊤ and,
2. X+ ⊢ 〈0〉Xϕ → 〈0〉X 〈0〉Xϕ.
These two observations account for a proof of (3) for the empty worm and worms
of the form 〈0〉A′. For worms of the form 〈n+ 1〉A′ we see by 2d that
〈0〉X 〈n+ 1〉XA
′ ↔ ∀k〈0〉X 〈n〉XQ
k
n(A
′).
But, as by 2b, GLP is sound for our modalities, we get that all the Qkn(A
′)
are <0-below 〈n + 1〉⊤ and we have the right-hand side from the induction
hypothesis.
For the sake of presentation we have chosen X and U such that in some sense
EA
PA =
X
U in which case we would be justified to say that the Π
0
1-proof theoretic
ordinal of U relative to X is ε0.
It is clear that Theorem 6.1 above can be extended to larger orderings once
we have extended our notion of fundamental sequence as in Definition 3.6 also
for modalities with limit ordinals. This is unproblematic in principle but may
slightly depend on the choice of fundamental sequences of the ordinals inside
the modalities. The important observation is that the use of the full Reduction
Property can be avoided.
7 Going beyond PA: recent developments
In this final section we just wish to briefly report on ongoing work to find
arithmetical interpretations for GLPΛ with Λ > ω.
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7.1 Truth-predicates and reflection
Lev Beklemishev and Evgeniy Dashkov –both at Moscow State University– have
been studying interpretations of GLPω·2 where an additional truth-predicate
for arithmetical formulas is added to the language of arithmetic. Within this
framework they can express reflection for arithmetical formulas and slightly
beyond.
The work is still unpublished but they have presented some results where
they go up to [ω+ω] while preserving the full Reduction Property at the price of
giving up the nice modal logic GLP. Rather they switch to a positive fragment
of GLP to account for the fact that certain reflection principles (at limit stages)
are not finitely axiomatizable.
7.2 Omega rule interpretations
Andre´s Cordo´n Franco, David Ferna´ndez Duque, and Fe´lix Lara Mart´ın from
the University of Sevilla, in collaboration with the author are studying an inter-
pretation where, within an infinitary proof calculus [α] is read as “provable with
α nested applications of the omega rule”. Soundness w.r.t. this interpretation
has been proved and completeness seems feasible too. However, not much is
known to what extend the Reduction Property holds for this interpretation.
7.3 Levy’s reflection results
Joan Bagaria from ICREA and the University of Barcelona suggested in discus-
sions with the author the following set-theoretical reading of our modalities [n]
for n ∈ ω. Let X be the theory ZFC− {Repl+ Inf}. It is established in a paper
from Levy ([1]) that
ZFC ≡ X + RFN(X ).
Here, RFN refers to the following notion of reflection: For each (externally
quantified) natural number n, we denote by RFNΣn(X ) the following principle
∀ϕ∈Σn ∀a ∃α∈On [Vα |= ϕ(a) ⇔ |=n ϕ(a)].
Here, |=n refers to partial truth predicates that are known to exist for ZFC
and subtheories. At first sight it seems that replacement is needed to define
the entities Vα. However, in the absence of replacement one can work with
the Scott-rank instead and define Vα := {x | rank(x) ≤ α} where rank(x) ≤ α
is definable in X making use of the transitive closure. We now define classes
that collect the ordinals α for which the partial universes Vα are Σn elementary
substructures of V :
C(n) := {α | Vα ≺Σn V }.
It is a theorem by Levy that the classes C(n) are Πn definable in X . Next, we
define
〈n〉T ϕ :⇔ ∃α∈C
(n) [Vα |= T ∧ Vα |= ϕ]
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It seems that all 2 (a)–(c) are satisfied for this notion of provability. In particular
we have that 〈n〉ϕ→ [m]〈n〉ϕ since 〈n〉T is definable in a Σn+1-fashion. As we
cannot obtain that
ZFC 0 TI(Π01, ε0)
we must conclude that (d) does not hold and that the two theories are not
equi-consistent.
7.4 On a (relative) proof-theoretical ordinal of ZFC
We conclude by a simple observation on a proof theoretical ordinal of ZFC. It
is generally believed that an ordinal analysis for ZFC is currently way out of
reach. With the methods presented here one might hope that at least an ordinal
analysis relative to some strong base theory of ZFC might be possible.
However, if such an analysis were to be given, it is most likely to be for-
malizable within ZFC itself. As ZFC proves transfinite induction over any well-
ordering, this implies that the order type involved in such an ordinal analysis
of ZFC must be represented inside ZFC in such a way that ZFC does not prove
it is indeed a well-order.
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